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How does renegotiation aect contracts between a principal and an agent subject to persis-
tent private information and moral hazard? This paper introduces a concept of renegotiation-
proofness, which adapts to stochastic games the concepts of weak renegotiation-proofness and
internal consistency by exploiting natural comparisons across states. When the agent has expo-
nential utility and cost of eort, each separating renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by
a single \sensitivity" parameter, which determines how the agent's promised utility varies with
reported cash ows. The optimal contract among those always causes immiserization. Reducing
the agent's cost of eort can harm the principal by increasing the tension between moral hazard
and reporting problems. Truthfulness of the constructed contracts is obtained by allowing jumps
in cash ow reports and turning the agent's reporting problem into an impulse control problem.
This approach shows that self-correcting reports are optimal o the equilibrium path. The paper
also discusses the case of partially pooling contracts and of permanent outside options for the
agent, illustrating the interaction between cash-ow persistence, renegotiation, moral hazard,
and information revelation.
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the University of Tokyo, Yale University, the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole HEC for questions and comments.1 Introduction
This paper analyzes a principal-agent model where the agent must report and transfer to the
principal privately observed cash-ows that are persistent and aected by the agent's eort process
(pure cash-ow diversion is a special case), and subject to exogenous shocks. In exchange, the
agent receives a consumption ow from the principal.1
Persistent private information signicantly increases the complexity of the optimal contract under
full commitment, which must keep track of the \threat-keeping constraint," as rst observed by
Fernandez and Phelan (2000). This paper demonstrates that renegotiation, a natural feature in
many environments,2 reduces the complexity of feasible contracts. Allowing for renegotiation does
bring a number of conceptual and technical diculties of its own, which are studied here.3
The main diculty is to dene an appropriate set of contracts that can be credibly oered upon
renegotiation. The larger this set, and the smaller the set of renegotiation-proof contracts. Existing
notions of renegotiation-proofness, which were created for repeated games, are either too weak (the
set of challengers is too small, and the set of renegotiation-proof contracts is too large) or too
strong (a renegotiation-proof contract may not exist). These notions are even more problematic
in settings with an underlying state: weak notions do not allow comparisons across states, while
strong notions eliminate any contract that does not perform well after some state. The approach
followed here is to exploit payo-relevant connections across states to make natural comparisons of
continuation contracts across states. A contract that survives the resulting comparisons is called
\consistent across states," \state consistent" or \renegotiation-proof."
The paper characterizes the set of all separating, state-consistent contracts, and the optimal con-
tract among those, assuming that the agent has exponential utility and eort cost functions. Any
renegotiation-proof contract is characterized by a single \sensitivity" parameter, which determines
both the agent's incentive to truthfully report cash ows and his incentive for eort. For any such
contract, all contractual variables have exact formulas as a function of the sensitivity parameter.
1While the paper focuses on an employer-employee relationship, the model could also be interpreted as insurance
problem, as in Green (1987), Thomas and Worrall (1990), in which case the agent simply reports income and receives
subsidies from the principal.
2As observed by DeMarzo and Fishman (2007, p. 2098), renegotiation is likely to be feasible: \In the United
States, courts will generally not enforce contractual provisions against renegotiation. This places restrictions on what
can be achieved by an optimal contract and is a form of contract incompleteness."
3The type of renegotiation considered here amounts to a partial form of commitment, dubbed \commitment and
renegotiation" by Laont and Tirole (1990), and dened as follows: \The two parties sign a long-term contract that
is enforced if any of the parties wants it to be enforced. However nothing prevents the parties from agreeing to alter
the initial contract."
2The range of these sensitivity parameters only depends on a single parameter of the model, the
risk-aversion coecient of the agent. In particular, it is unaected, by the presence of moral hazard,
compared to a pure cash-ow diversion problem.
All renegotiation-proof contracts are such that the agent wants to report cash-ows truthfully, not
only on the equilibrium path, but also after any possible deviation. Thus, even if, at time zero, the
principal has a wrong belief about the initial cash-ow, a renegotiation-proof contract of the type
studied here will induce the agent to immediately reveal the true cash-ow level.4
The optimal contract is obtained by maximizing a closed-form objective function with respect to
the sensitivity parameter, which makes it easy to study its properties.
As a result of risk-aversion, the agent's continuation utility under the optimal contract exhibits
immiserization:5 almost surely, it becomes arbitrarily negative as time elapses. Immiserization
arises for all parameter values of the model. Intuitively, it is less costly to provide the right
incentives to the agent when his continuation utility is low, because he is more sensitive to small
changes in the consumption ow. Other things equal, this makes the principal prefer to provide
more utility ow today and let continuation utility drift downwards, compared to the constant
promised utility and utility ow arising in the rst-best contract.
Furthermore, the optimal sensitivity is decreasing in the magnitude of exogenous shocks: risk-
aversion makes it more costly for the principal to provide a given level of promised utility, when
uctuations are wider. A lower sensitivity parameter, in turn, reduces the principal's ability to
elicit high eort from the agent and increases his incentive to underreport cash ows, other things
equal, which always results in a lower payo for the principal.
Because the agent's information is persistent, the combined presence of moral hazard and adverse
selection cannot be reduced to a pure moral hazard or to a pure adverse selection problem (in
contrast to what earlier literature has pointed out for the i.i.d. case). In particular, while reducing
the agent's cost of eort always improves the principal's rst-best payo, it can arbitrarily reduce
the principal's second-best payo. The intuition may be explained as follows. With lower eort
cost, the agent arbitrarily increases his promised utility, for any xed positive sensitivity parameter,
by putting more eort. Although such eort increases the principal's cash ows, the increase in
promised utility is more costly to the principal, due to concavity of the agent's utility. To oset
this problem, the principal optimally reduces the sensitivity of the contract. This, however, reduces
4Such feature is interesting, for example, if one thinks of the agent as a new CEO who discovers, upon taking the
job, that the nancial situation of the rm is worse than what outsiders think. In such case, the contracts studied
here give the agent the incentives to correctly book a nonrecurring loss on the rm's accounts.
5See Thomas and Worrall (1990).
3his ability to induce truthful reporting from the agent. The only way the principal can do that is
by also reducing the agent's marginal value of lying, which, in turn, can only be obtained by an
providing arbitrarily large utility ow.6
As a result, a principal who could invest initially to reduce the cost function of the agent optimally
choose to forgo this option: Even if productivity improvements can be made at little no cost, such
improvements can reduce the principal's second best payo.
Absent full commitment, it is well known that the revelation principle need not hold (see in particu-
lar Bester and Strausz (2001)). This paper characterizes truthful (or separating) renegotiation-proof
contracts, and the optimal such contract. A priori, the optimal renegotiation-proof contract may
involve pooling: i.e., the principal may prefer a contract where he does not learn how the cash-ows
of the agent evolve. However, as discussed in Section 7, the principal has an incentive to elicit in-
formation from the agent, and cannot commit not to do so. In contrast to the setting analyzed by
Laont and Tirole (1988), the principal can repeatedly propose new contracts, and learn, gradually,
the type of the agent. (See Section 7.) In continuous time, the problem is particularly severe, as
the principal can propose an arbitrarily large number of contracts in any interval of time, however
small, which allows him to elicit a lot of information. Renegotiation harms the principal not only
because it aects the agent's ex ante incentives but also, potentially, by reducing the principal's
ability not to learn about the agent's type.
Reporting incentives are linear for any arbitrary contract, which implies that the agent is either
indierent between telling the truth and lying, or wishes to lie at maximal (innite) rate, either
upwards or downwards. This makes it necessary to model jumps in the agent's reports. A contract
must specify how such jumps aect promised utility. For the renegotiation-proof contracts studied
here, this contractual relation is naturally pinned down by the sensitivity parameter characterizing
each of these contracts. The agent's incentives are characterized by a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
equation with an impulse response component, which provides a new (in the contracting literature,
to the author's knowledge) and simple way to deal with the possibility of unbounded drift of the
reporting process. Using this technique, it is possible to derive the agent's value function not only
on the equilibrium path, but also after any possible deviation. This value is a very simple function
of the agent's promised utility, of the current gap between reported and actual cash ows, and of
the sensitivity parameter.
The paper contributes to the literature on renegotiation7 and more particularly contracting and
renegotiation with innite horizon.8 Several denitions of renegotiation-proofness have been pro-
6See Section 5.1 and, in particular, Equation (22).
7See Laont and Tirole (1988,1990) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1990).
8For limits of renegotiation-proof contracting with nite horizon, see Beno^ t and Krishna (1993).
4posed for repeated games, in particular by Bernheim and Ray (1989) and Farrell and Maskin (1989),
none of which is fully satisfactory (see, e.g., Asheim (1991)). These notions are even more prob-
lematic for stochastic games. Indeed, the weak notions (weak renegotiation proofness and internal
consistency) do not allow comparisons across states.9 An exception is Gromb (1994), who studies
a binary-state dynamic model of debt contracts, and compares continuation payos across the two
states.
The paper also contributes to the literature on dynamic contracting with persistent private in-
formation, as initiated by Fernandez and Phelan (2000).10 In addition to the employer-employee
interpretation, the paper can be interpreted as an insurance model or an optimal taxation model11
where the agent reports income and gets subsidized or taxed according to his reports. The presence
of moral hazard and persistent information combines ingredients of the literature on career concerns
with contracts, as studied by Gibbons and Murphy (1990). In the model studied here, putting a
higher eort today raises the all future cash ows (as if the agent were investing in skills), but
reduces the transfers payments to the agent, other things equal.
Many features of the underlying model come from Williams (2009), who focuses on full commitment
and a pure reporting problem.12 Zhang (2008) also proposes a continuous-time model with persis-
tent information and a binary type. Discrete-time models of contracting with persistent information
include Tchistyi (2006), who considers a pure cash-ow diversion problem with binary cash ows,
and Kapicka (2006) who considers a rst-order approach. Fukushima and Waki (2009) propose a
numerical analysis for a setting with persistent private information. Doepke and Townsend (2006)
introduce a numerical method to analyze the optimal contract with moral hazard and adverse
selection.13 All these papers assume full commitment. Another kind of contracting with per-
sistent private information concerns delegated experimentation as analyzed by Bergemann and
Hege (2005), H orner and Samuelson (2010), and Garfagnini (2010). In these papers, the agent's
eort intensity to learn about the value of an action is privately observed, and may result in the
9These weak notions do imply Markov payos in principal-agent environments, as used by Bergemann and
Hege (2005).
10The recursive approach, which plays a major role in the renegotiation concept studied here, dates back to Green
(1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), and Thomas and Worrall (1990), who introduce the use of promised utility as
a state variable.
11For recent models of each type, see respectively Golosov and Tsivinsky (2006), who study a particular kind of
information persistence, and Golosov et al. (2003).
12The approach and techniques followed in the present paper could also be used to analyze contracting under full
commitment, with promised marginal utility as an additional state, oering an alternative to Williams's stochastic
maximum principle approach.
13In Doepke and Townsend (2006), income at any given period only depends on the agent's action at the previous
period, and hence does not exhibit the type of direct persistence studied in this and other cited papers.
5principal and the agent having dierent beliefs about that value, hence the private information of
the agent.
Section 2 introduces the principal-agent setting with moral hazard and persistent private infor-
mation, and Section 3 introduces a new concept of renegotiation-proofness for stochastic games,
called state consistency. Section 4 characterizes state-consistent contracts in the principal-agent
setting. Section 5 establishes several comparative statics: i) the optimal renegotiation-proof con-
tract always exhibits immiserization: the agent's promised utility drifts to minus innity almost
surely, ii) increasing productivity (at not cost) can reduce the principal's payo, iii) increasing noise
of the technology always reduces the principal's payo and its ability to induce eort. Section 6
shows that all state-consistent contracts are incentive compatible, even o the equilibrium path
(i.e., the agent has an incentive to correct any misreport that occurred earlier). Section 7 considers
the possibility issue of pooling contracts. Section 8 considers the case where the agent has a per-
manent outside option, and shows how the analysis renegotiation-proofness is aected by this new
constraint. Section 9 discusses extensions of the model. Proofs omitted from the main text are in
the Appendix (Section 10).
2 Setting
An agent generates cash ow Xt at time t, governed by the dynamic equation
dXt = [(   Xt) + At]dt + dBt; (1)
where At 2 R is the agent's eort at time t and B is the standard Brownian motion. The cash
ow has a mean reversion component, with speed  and long run average =. A low (high) mean-
reversion speed  results in high (low) persistence of the cash ows and, hence, of the agent's private
information. Precisely,  is the rate at which the impact of current cash ow level on future cash
ows decays over time.
The agent incurs a cost (a) to produce eort a, where  is increasing and convex. In the compu-
tations to follow,  will be exponential: (a) =  exp(a).
The Brownian motion B is for now the only source of exogenous uncertainty. There is a xed a
probability space (
;F;P) satisfying the usual conditions, such that each outcome ! is identied
with a path realization for B.14
14Section 4.1 considers randomization. In that case, the probability space must be enlarged to account for these
other sources of exogenous uncertainty.
6The agent reports and transfers to the principal a cash-ow Yt such that
dYt = dXt + Ltdt = [(   Xt) + At + Lt]dt + dBt: (2)
Lt is the rate at which the agent \lies" about the true increment dXt of the cash-ow.15





The case of a pure reporting problem with persistent private information and no moral hazard
(a = 0 everywhere) obtains at the limit for the exponential cost function as  becomes arbitrarily
large.16
The principal provides a consumption process Ct to the agent. A contract is a consumption process
C adapted to the ltration generated by the report process Y .17
Whenever a recursive formulation of the contract is used with the agent's promised utility as one
component of the state, a contract must also stipulate an eort process  A adapted to Y . That
eort is used to compute i) the drift of the agent's continuation utility, and ii) the \innovation"
(or \surprise") in the agent's reported cash-ow increment, compared to the expected increment.
(See (3).)
The principal observes only the reports fYtg, but the initial cash-ow is publicly known, so that
Y0 = X0.
The agent's strategy is a lying process L and an eort process A adapted to the agent's information
X.18







e rt (u(Ct + Xt   Yt)   (At))dt

;
where u is a strictly concave utility function. Computations to follow focus on the case where u
is exponential: u(c) =  exp(c) for some risk-aversion coecient . The set of promised utility is
then W = ( 1;0).
15Such lie may be unbounded. Section 6 allows the agent to report jumps in his cash ows, and propose a natural
extension of the contract to this case.
16In that case, the cost function becomes at on ( 1;0] and arbitrarily large for a > 0, and the agent's optimal
action converges to zero as  ! 1.
17Section 7 allows the principal to use public randomization, in addition to the reports, to determine consumption.
18This is without loss of generality, since X determines Y through L.
7A contract (C;  A) is incentive compatible given (w;y) if it is optimal for the agent to report and
transfer truthfully the real cash-ow process X and to implement the stipulated action  A, given
that the initial cash ow is y, and if the resulting expected lifetime utility for the agent is w.
For simplicity, the eort process will sometimes be dropped from the denition: a contract C is
incentive compatible given (w;y) if it is optimal for the agent to report and transfer truthfully the
real-cash ow process X, given that the initial cash ow is equal to y, and that this, along with the
action process optimally chosen by the agent, yields an expected lifetime utility of w to the agent.
The agent immediately consumes the sum of the consumption Ct provided by the principal and of
the dierence Xt  Yt between real and transferred cash ows. (the possibility of private savings is
discussed in Section 9).







The contract must initially provide the agent with some minimal expected promised utility w:
V0  w:
As is often assumed in the literature on dynamic contracting, the agent loses his outside option
after time zero, and is fully committed to the contract.19 Similarly, the principal is at all times
fully committed to providing the agent his promised utility, although he may propose at any time
new contracts that preserve the agent's promised utility.
Persistence of private information creates a complex strategic environment. For example, if the
agent has lied even for a short period before time t, he has aected the report history Y t = fYsgst.
He has therefore aected his future consumption ow C and his future incentives to report the truth.
Hidden actions add to this complexity: current eort aects immediate cash-ows but also future
ones, owing to their persistence, and hence the entire consumption process and the distribution of
all future states.
From the Martingale Representation Theorem,20 the promised utility of the agent satises
dWt = (rWt   u(Ct + Yt   Xt) + (  At))dt + Std ~ Bt; (3)
for some process St adapted to the ltration of the principal, and where ~ Bt is a Brownian motion
under the probability measure where the agent reports truthfully and chooses the prescribed eort
19The case where the agent keeps his outside option throughout the lifetime of the contract is discussed in detail
in Section 8.
20See, e.g., Karatzas and Shreve (1991)
8 At, i.e.,
d ~ Bt =
dYt   (   Yt)dt    Atdt

=
(   Xt)   (   Yt) + At    At + Ltdt + dBt

:
The sensitivity St describes how promised utility varies with reports from the agent, and is chosen
by the principal in the recursive formulation of the problem.21






e rt (u(Ct + Yt   Xt)   (At))dt

;
subject to (1), (2), and (3).
If the agent misreports his cash-ow increment dXt at time t, he aects two things: the change
of his promised utility, which is sensitive to the report dYt by a factor St, and the change of the
principal's future consumption C. Indeed, for a given promised utility, the principal must provide
higher payments to the agent, other things equal, if he thinks that the cash-ow is lower. The
former channel gives an incentive for the agent to make high reports, which the second channel
gives him an incentive to report a lower cash-ow. For the contract to be incentive compatible,
these two incentives must balance each other.
3 Renegotiation-Proofness: Concepts and State Consistency
In repeated games, an equilibrium is said to be weakly renegotiation-proof (Farrell and Maskin,
1989), or internally consistent (Bernheim and Ray, 1989), if there are no two histories such that
the continuation payos after the rst history Pareto dominate those following the second history.
With stochastic games, internal consistency is too weak, because it does not allow comparison
across states. In the present setting, the state consists of the current cash-ow and of the utility
promised to the agent. A contract is internally consistent if there are no two histories leading to
the same underlying state (cash ow and promised utility) such that the principal gets a strictly
higher continuation payo after the rst history than after the second one.22;23
21This representation may be compared to the discrete time, where the principal would have to specify changes in
promised utility for each possible report of the agent. Continuous time linearizes the problem, and the derivative St,
a single number, completely describes how reported cash-ow increments aect the agent's promised utility.
22It is assumed that if the agent is indierent, he agrees to switch to this new contract. The principal can always
give an innitesimal share of the gain to the agent to convince him to switch.
23This extension of internal consistency, which was also made by Bergemann and Hege (2005), immediately implies
that the principal's payo, after any history, only depends on the current state (w;y). Showing that the contractual
variables themselves are Markov is more dicult, and not generally true. See Section 4.1.
9To see how internal consistency may be strengthened for stochastic games, it is useful to think
about its rationale. Internal consistency presumes that, after observing the second history, the
principal is able to recognize that he could use the continuation contract following the rst history
and achieve a higher payo.24 This cognitive ability should extend to other natural comparisons, as
described next.
Consider a consumption process Ct resulting in some promised utility w1 for the agent and some
payo 1 to the principal (ignoring for now incentive compatibility and other considerations). Now
suppose that the principal must provide utility w2 = w1
2 to the agent and that the ow utility
function of the agent is concave. Then, the consumption process ~ Ct = Ct
2 provides at least w2
to the agent. Let 2 denote the resulting payo for the principal. The principal can make the
following comparison: suppose that, starting from state w1, the contract reaches some time at
which the promised utility of the agent is Wt = w2 = w1=2, and the continuation for the principal
is t. If t < 2, the principal could reason that, by restarting the contract exactly as it did from
time zero, but uniformly halving the consumption process, he could achieve the higher payo 2.
This comparison creates a comparison across states.
This suggests the following denition. Suppose that, starting from any contract C that is incentive
compatible given (w1;y), there is an operation G that \transforms" this contract into another
contract ~ C = Gw1;w2(C) that is incentive compatible given (w2;y) (in the previous example, the
transformation was to halve the consumption process). The contract C is consistent from w1 to w2
if the payo ~ 2 achieved by ~ C is not strictly greater than the continuation payo achieved under
C after any history such that Wt = w2 and Yt = y. If that condition did not held, the principal
could obtain a higher payo by proposing contract ~ C, after the relevant history, instead of the
continuation contract initially specied.
The operation should be reversible in the following sense: if, starting from the transformed contract
~ C = Gw1;w2(C), one applies a similar operation Gw2;w1( ~ C) to get a contract that is incentive
compatible given (w1;y), the resulting contract is the initial contract C. Moreover, the operation
should be consistent: (Gw2;w3  Gw1;w2)(C) = Gw1;w3(C).
In the present setting, there is an even simpler comparison across initial cash ow conditions, which
is described in Section 4.3.1. Taking this as given for now, the transformation G is extended to all
pairs of states f(w1;y1);(w2;y2)g.
Definition 1 A contract C that is incentive compatible given (w;y) is state-consistent (relative to
G) or consistent across states if, after any history leading up to any state ( ~ w; ~ y) and continuation
24Of course, such change could aect the agent's incentives to report truthfully ex ante. Eventually, the goal is to
characterize contracts that are both renegotiation-proof and incentive compatible.
10contract ~ C, the continuation payo ( ~ C) for the principal is weakly greater than (G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C)),
and reciprocally, the initial payo (C) is weakly greater than (G( ~ w;~ y);(w;y)( ~ C)).
Thus, not only the continuation payos must sustain comparison with transformations of the ini-
tial contract, but the reverse is also true: the initial contract must sustain the comparison with
transformations of the continuation contracts consistent with the initial state.
Finally, say that the transformation G is monotone if, for any two contracts C;C0 that are incentive
compatible given (w;y), and yield principal payos (C)  (<)(C0), and any other state ( ~ w; ~ y),
the payos of the transformed contracts ~ C = G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C) and ~ C0 = G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C0) satisfy
( ~ C)  (<)( ~ C0).
Proposition 1 Suppose that G is monotone and let C denote any contract incentive compatible
for some state (w;y) and state-consistent (with respect to G). Then, after any nite history ending
with state ( ~ w; ~ y), the continuation payo for the principal is equal to his initial payo under the
contract G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C).
Restricted to pairs such that ( ~ w; ~ y) = (w;y), state consistency boils down to internal consistency.
The next section explores the consequences of this denition.
4 Characterization of State-Consistent Contracts
4.1 Contractual Variables are Markov
As observed in the previous section, the principal's continuation payo for any internally consistent
contract only depends, at any time, on the current state (w;y). Let (w;y) denote the principal's
payo.
More can be obtained: the contractual variables themselves only depend on (w;y), under some
additional conditions. The principal can choose two variables at each time: the consumption rate
c provided to the agent, and the sensitivity s of the promised utility to reported cash-ow. For
a given internally consistent contract C and states (w;y), let K(w;y) = f(Ct(!);St(!)) : (t;!) 2
R+
;Wt(!) = w;Yt(!) = yg denote the set of consumption and sensitivity levels that may arise,
under contract C, after some history leading to state (w;y). The goal is to show that these sets
are in fact singletons, so that the consumption and sensitivity chosen by the principal indeed only
depend on w and on y. Allowing the principal to randomize across two continuation contracts
11convexies the set K(w;y).25;26 Weak renegotiation proofness implies that the principal is free to














where a(s) is the eort level optimally chosen by the agent, and is given by the rst-order condition
0(a(s)) = s.28 The objective is strictly concave in c and in s, provided that i) w and ww are
negative (i.e., the principal's payo is decreasing in the agent's promised utility, other things equal,
and strictly concave in the agent's promised utility), y is positive (i.e., the principal's payo is
increasing in the current cash-ow, keeping promised utility constant), and ii) u is strictly concave,
(a(s)) is weakly concave in s, and a(s) is weakly convex in s. The latter set of conditions is
satised if  is exponential and Section 4.3.3 independently shows that the rst set of conditions
is always satised for state-consistent contracts with exponential utility and cost functions.
Strict concavity of the objective function and convexity of the domain S(w;y) imply that the
maximizing pair c(w;y);s(w;y) is unique, which shows that the contractual variables are Markov
(and, therefore, that the set K(w;y) had to be a singleton).
As a result, the agent faces a standard optimal control problem where the variables are the public,
contractual state variables w and y, and the actual cash-ow x that is privately observed by the
agent.
25The agent chooses his report and action, at each instant t, before observing the outcome of the randomization.
26The randomization adds a new source of uncertainty, for the purpose of the presented argument.
27Bergemann and Hege (2005, Theorem 3) also exploit the Bellman equation to show that any weakly renegotiation-
proof contract must be Markov. That paper does not address the possibility of multiple maximizers of the Bellman
equation, for any given state.
28The argument for pinning down the eort level given the sensitivity parameter s is similar to Sannikov (2008,
Proposition 2), which does not assume a Markovian structure. In the present setting, eort also has an indirect
impact of reported cash ows and rewards, but this impact is identical to the impact of a lie, and must vanish for
any incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) contract, as illustrated by Equations (7) and (8) for the Markovian case.
124.2 Necessary Conditions for Incentive Compatibility
The agent's Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation is
0 = sup
l;a
f[u(p(w;y) + x)   (a)]   rv(w;y;x)
+ vw [rw   u(p(w;y) + y) + ( a(w;y)) + s(w;y)(l + (a    a(w;y)) + (y   x))]
+vy[(   x) + l + a] + vx[(   x) + a] + q(w;y;x)g; (5)
where q(w;y;x) = 2  
vwws2 + vxx + vyy + vwxs + vw;ys + vxy

is independent from l and from a.
Incentive compatibility and optimality imply several regularity properties of v.29 First, if the
contract is incentive compatible, v(w;x;x) = w for all w;x, which implies that
vw(w;x;x) = 1 (6)
for all w and x. Second, as will be seen shortly, the Envelope Theorem implies that vx(w;y;x)
exists and is continuous for all (w;y;x). Taken together, these observations imply that vy(w;y;x)
exists whenever y = x, and that
vy(w;x;x) =  vx(w;x;x)
for all w;x.
Proposition 2 If the contract (w;x) 7! p(w;x) is incentive compatible, then there exists a viscosity





s(w;x) + vy(w;x;x) = 0 (7)
for all w and x. Moreover, the agent's optimal eort a(w;y;x) satises
0(a(w;x;x)) = vx(w;x;x) = s(w;x): (8)
Reciprocally, if there exists a solution  v to (5) such that  v(w;x;x) = w for all w;x, then  v is the
value function of the agent, the contact is incentive compatible, and (8) holds.
29In general, the value function v is only a viscosity solution to the equation (see Fleming and Soner, 2006,
Chapter 5).
13Incentive compatibility is characterized by nding a global solution v to (5), i.e., a solution that
holds for all possible values of the state (w;y;x), and then check that (7) holds (or, equivalently,
that v(w;x;x) = w) for that solution.






e rt (u(Ct(Ys : s  t) + Yt   Xt)   (At))dt

;
where Ct() is, for each t, a functional that determines the consumption provided to the agent at
time t given past reports Ys : s  t. If the initial cash-ow is increased by ", this aects the
distribution of future incomes and, keeping the lying process xed, of future reports. However, by
a change of variable, one can control the path of the report process Yt, and make it independent
from the initial cash-ow change. Recall that
dYt = [(   Xt) + At + Lt]dt + dBt:
Making the change of variable  Lt = Lt + (   Xt)   (   Yt), one gets
dYt = [(   Yt) + At +  Lt]dt + dBt: (9)






e rt (u(Ct(Ys : s  t) + Yt   Xt)   (At))

:
subject to Y0 = y, X0 = x, (9), and
dXt = (   Xt)dt + At + dBt:
dWt = (rWt   u(Xt   Yt + Ct(Ys : s  t)) + (  At))dt + St
 
dYt   ((   Yt) +  At)dt

:
If the contract is incentive compatible, it is optimal to set  Lt = 0 whenever initial conditions are
such that y = x. By the Envelope Theorem (Milgrom and Segal, 2002), this implies that vx(w;x;x)
can be computed by evaluating the objective function at  Lt  0 or, equivalently, under the report
process Yt starting from y0 = x0. Under this approach, W, Y , C, and  A are independent from the






E[u(Xt   Yt + C(Ys : s  t))]dt:









14The process X, as dened by the dynamic equation (1), is a generalization of Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process and can be explicitly integrated:
Xt = e tx +
Z t
0




This implies that dXt




e (r+)tu0(Xt + Pt)dt: (11)
4.3 State Consistency
4.3.1 Comparing Contracts Across Cash-Flows Levels
Starting with initial conditions w;y;x, the agent's value for a given strategy (L;A) is
V (w;y;x;L;A) = E
Z 1
0
e rt (u(c(Wt;Yt)   Gt)   (At))dt

(12)
subject to (1), (2),
dWt = (rWt   u(Ct) + (  At))dt + s(Wt;Xt + Gt)(Ltdt + Atdt + Gt + dBt);
dGt = Ltdt
and the initial conditions W0 = w and Y0 = y, X0 = x, G0 = y   x.





Suppose that the contract C is incentive compatible given (w;y): Ct = C(Ys : s  t) for some
functional C.
Starting from a dierent cash-ow level ^ y, and given a report process ^ Yt, suppose that the principal
pays the consumption process ^ Ct = C(~ Ys : s  t), where ~ Y is constructed as follows: ~ Y0 = y, and
d~ Yt = d^ Yt   (   ^ Yt)dt + (   ~ yt)dt.
The intuition for this construction is as follows. First, the principal reconstructs the reports ~ Y that
the agent would have made, had he started from y instead of ^ y, under the same realization of the
Brownian path that generated report history ^ Y , assuming that the agent is truthful and follows
the action process A. Second, the principal provides the consumption that he would have provided
under the contract C, had the agent started from y instead of ^ y and made the report ~ Y .
15In the Appendix, it is shown that this construction yields an incentive compatible contract given
(w; ^ y). If L;A was an optimal strategy for the agent, starting from y, it must also be optimal given
the new contract.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the contract process Ct = C(Ys : s  t) along with the prescribed eort
process At is incentive compatible given (w;y). Then, the reconstructed process ^ Ct = C(~ Ys : s  t)
along with the same prescribed eort process A is incentive compatible given (w; ^ y).
The contract ^ C is called the (w; ^ y)-version of C.
The processes C and ^ C have the same distribution. Therefore, the principal has the same expected
consumption cost under these two contracts. The only dierence for the principal, then, is the
































4.3.2 Comparing Contracts Across Promised-Utility Levels
From now on, the agent is assumed to have the utility function u(c) =  exp( c) and the cost
function (a) =  exp(a). In particular, utility is always negative.
Suppose that, starting from initial conditions (w0;y), the contract C is incentive compatible and
induces the eort process A. That is, letting v(L;AjC) denote the agent's expected utility when
he follows strategy L;A and given contract C,
v(0;AjC) = w0  v(L0;A0jC)
for all (L0;A0). Now consider another promised utility level w1 = w0 for  2 (0;1) and the initial
state (w1;x). Dene a new contract ( ^ C; ^ A) as follows
^ Ct = Ct  
log()

16^ At = At +
log()

Proposition 4 (C;A) is incentive compatible and provides expected utility w0 if and only if ( ^ C; ^ A)
is incentive compatible and provides expected utility w1.
Proof. For any ^ L0; ^ A0, let L0 = ^ L0 and A0 = ^ A0   log()=. Then,
v(^ L0; ^ A0j ^ C) = v(L0;A0jC)  v(0;AjC) = w0 = w1;
with the inequality being tight if ^ L0 = 0 and ^ A0 = ^ A. 
The contract ^ C is called the (w1;y)-version of C.
Let (C;A) denote the expected payo for the principal when the agent receives the consumption
process C and follows eort process A, and let (w;y) denote the value function of the principal












The previous analysis yields the following result.
Proposition 5 To any contract C that is incentive compatible given (w;y) corresponds another
contract C0 that is incentive compatible give (w0;y0), called the (w0;y0)-version of C.















4.3.3 Form of State-Consistent Contracts
Combined together, Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 dene a class of transformations G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y) which,
to any contract C that is incentive compatible given (w;y), associates an incentive compatible
~ C = G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C) that is incentive compatible given ( ~ w; ~ y).
The transformations are clearly monotone, so that state consistency implies the following relation-
ships for the principal's payo function, as a consequence of Proposition 1.31
30The eort taken at any time has a decaying eect on all future incomes, with decaying rate , discounted at
rate r. This explains the factor (r + ) in the denominator.
31As mentioned in Section 4.1, Proposition 6 has been established without assuming Markov contractual variables,
and is thus independent from the analysis of Section 4.1.















To pin down the contractual variables, one proceeds as in Section 4.1. State consistency extends
the set of feasible challengers that the principal may consider after any possible history, which may
be exploited to show that the contractual variables must take a very specic form.
Consider some internally-consistent contract C that is incentive compatible given some arbitrary
conditions (w0;y0). For any outcome ! and time t, let Ct(!) denote the continuation contract of
C at time t as outcome ! unfolds. For any ( ~ w; ~ y), let
 C( ~ w; ~ y) = fCt(!) : (t;!) 2 [0;1)  
 s.t. (Wt;Yt) = ( ~ w; ~ y)g
denote the set of all continuation contracts generated by C after any history leading up to state
( ~ w; ~ y). Let also
C(w;y) = [( ~ w;~ y)2WR
n
G( ~ w;~ y);(w;y)( ~ C) : ~ C 2  C( ~ w; ~ y)
o
denote the set of all contracts that are (w;y)-versions of continuation contracts of C. The set
C(w;y) denes the class of all challengers that the principal can consider, after any history leading
up to state (w;y), to replace the current continuation contract. That set is larger than the one
corresponding to internal consistency, where only the continuation contracts starting from the same
state can be compared.
Finally, let I(w;y) = f( ~ C0; ~ S0) : ~ C 2 C(w;y)g. I(w;y) is the set of initial consumption-sensitivity
pairs for all contracts that are incentive compatible given (w;y) and generated from some contin-
uation contract of C.
After any such history the principal can choose, among the pairs in I(w;y), one that maximizes
his payo, as captured by the principal's HJB equation.
0 = sup
(c;s)2I(w;y)










where 0(a(s)) = s. Let ( c;  y) denote the optimum for (w;y), which is unique, since the functional
form of Proposition 6 and the fact that (a) =  exp(a) imply strict concavity of the objective. It
is easy to see that for any ( ~ w; ~ y), the pair (~ c; ~ s) = ( c   log( )=;  s), where  = ~ w=w, belongs to
I( ~ w; ~ w), and vice versa. Given the functional form of , this implies that ( c;  s) solves 15 at (w;y)
if and only if (~ c; ~ s) solves it at ( ~ w; ~ y), as is easily checked.
This establishes the following result.
18Proposition 7 A state-consistent contract has the form
Ct = c1  
log( Wt)

At = a1 +
log( Wt)

St =  Wt s
for all t, where c1, a1 and  s are the consumption, eort, and sensitivity provided at time 0 by the
version of the contract starting with promised utility  1 and any cash-ow level.
Therefore, the principal's optimal contracting problem boils down to optimization with respect to





Equivalently, c1 =  log( u1)= and a1 = log(1= )=.























Therefore, one needs to compute E[log( Wt)]. Recall that
dWt = [rWt   u(Ct) + (At)]dt + StdBt:
With the exponential specication, u(Ct) =  Wtu1 and (At) =  Wt1. This implies that, letting
!(t) = E[Wt] (so that !(0) = w)
!0(t) = (r + u1   1)!(t);
and hence that
E[Wt] = er+u1 1w: (16)








Combining this with (16) yields




   u1 + 1
> 0: (17)
Notice that  s <  for all u1 < 0,  > 0 and 1  0. Intuitively, if  s were higher than , the agent
would want exaggerate the cash-ow in order to articially increase his promised utility. The cost
of earning actually less than what is reported to the principal aect the utility by a rate , which
would be dominated by the increase in promised utility as measured by the sensitivity parameter
 s. Incentive compatible rules this case out.






as implied by equations (7) and (8).
This, along with (17), implies that
u1( s) =  
 s( +  s)
(    s)
: (18)
Letting Zt = log( Wt), It^ o's formula implies that
dZt = (r + u1   1)dt  
1
2
2 s2dt    sdBt:
Therefore,




















After further simplications and multiplication of the objective by r, the following result obtains.
Let  = 
(r+) > 0.













From Proposition 8, one may easily show that the drift of promised utility is negative, for the case































If the volatility  were equal to zero (no private information), or if  were innite (no persistence),
the nal, quadratic term in (21) would vanish, and the optimal u1 would equal  r, implying that
the drift of Wt, r +u1 is equal to zero. This would amount to pure consumption smoothing: given
concavity of the agent's utility function, the cheapest way to give him a promised utility of w is
through a constant consumption ow of rw, which keeps Wt constant (or, where  is nonzero,
implies that Wt is a martingale). In general however, the principal also needs to mitigate the







Therefore, this incentive to misreport is lower, other things equal, if u0 is lower. Since u is con-
cave, this means that providing more consumption has the additional benet, other things equal,
of reducing marginal utility and, therefore, the agent's incentive to misreport. Providing more con-
sumption today, compared to pure consumption smoothing, results in a negative drift for promised
utility and, therefore, in immiserization.
Mathematically, the rst-order condition of (21) includes the term  s(u1) s0(u1). The sensitivity
 s(u1) is decreasing in u1, as may easily be checked. This implies that the optimal u1 is strictly
32The last two terms of the objective are independent from  s and, therefore, have no impact on the maximization.
21greater than  r. Therefore, the drift of Wt, which equals Wt(r + u1), is negative, since Wt is
negative.
The result also holds in the presence of moral hazard, as shown in the Appendix.
Proposition 9 (Immiserization) For all parameters (r;;;;;  ), the optimal contract implies
a negative drift for Wt.
5.2 Changes in Eort Cost
This section shows that an arbitrarily at cost function for the eort of the agent may hurt the
principal.
Recall the rst-order condition for eort




When the eort cost parameter  goes to zero, it becomes arbitrarily cheap for the agent to
undertake any eort level.33 If  s is strictly positive, this means that as  goes to zero, the agent
makes an arbitrarily large eort, which is very costly to the principal, as it results in arbitrarily
large log utility (i.e., Wt gets arbitrarily close to zero). To avoid this situation, the principal has
to reduce the sensitivity  s to a level arbitrarily close to zero. However, this reduces his ability to
ensure truthtelling, the other channel through which the agent can deviate.
To keep inducing truthtelling, the principal has to reduce the magnitude of, vy, the marginal
benet from lying. By an argument similar to the one used for the immiserization result (see
Equation (22)), this can only be done by providing more immediate utility to the agent. Owing
to agent's decreasing marginal utility, this gets arbitrarily costly to the principal. As a result,
promised utility dives at a rate arbitrarily close to the discount rate r, and there is no consumption
smoothing.
The principal also receives arbitrarily large cash ows from the agent's eort, which may oset the
amount of consumption that he must provide to the agent. However, if the agent's initial promised
utility is high enough, the cost exceeds the benets, and the principal's payo gets arbitrarily
negative.34
Let () denote the principal's expected payo under the optimal state-consistent contract. The
following result is proved in the Appendix.
33More precisely, the cost function becomes at: the marginal cost of eort converges everywhere to zero.
34As  goes to zero, the immiserization eect becomes muted, as shown at the end of the proof of Proposition 10.
22Proposition 10 For all parameters (r;;;;  , if w >  1=r, () diverges to  1 as  goes to
zero. If w <  1=r, () diverges to +1 as  goes to zero.
The comparative statics with respect to the scaling parameter   are straightforward. From (19),
a higher scaling parameter for the cost function does not aect the optimal sensitivity  s, and
reduces the principal's objective only through the last term. This suggests that what matters most
Proposition 10 is the curvature of the cost function rather than the its scale: a atter cost functions
makes all actions more similar from the agent's viewpoint, whereas a homogeneous increase or
decrease of the cost functions does not aect the agent's preferences across actions (indeed, the
agent's optimal eort cost ( s) =  s= is independent from  ).
5.3 Impact of Noise
In contrast to the previous result, it is always in the principal's interest to reduce the noise, or
volatility, of the agent's output, and the optimal sensitivity coecient is decreasing in volatility.
Proposition 11 The optimal sensitivity s is decreasing in .
Proof. The objective 19 is submodular in  and s. The result then follows from Topkis (1978).
6 Verication of Incentive Compatibility
One must verify that for any  s < , the contract constructed in Section 4 is incentive compatible.
For exposition purposes, it is simpler to we focus on pure reporting. The argument is easily adapted
for the general case with moral hazard.
Under the contract, the promised utility evolves as
dWt = (r + u1   1)Wtdt + s(Wt)(dGt + Atdt + Gtdt + dBt); (23)
and the agent consumes c(Wt) Gt, where Gt = Yt  Xt. Therefore, the agent only cares about Xt






e rt (u(c(Wt)   Gt)   (At))dt

subject to dGt = Ltdt, G0 = g, and (23). The HJB equation for this problem is
0 = sup
l;a
fu(c(w)   g)   (a)   rv(w;g)






23where u(), (), a(), c() and s() have the forms given in Section 4.
One must show that there exists a solution to (24) such that v(w;0) = w for all w. This will establish
that, under the proposed contract, the best the agent can achieve is his promised utility, whenever
the current report is correct. It is natural to conjecture a solution of the form v(w;g) = wf(g) for
some function f to determine. Incentive compatibility will be established if one nds a solution f
such that f(0) = 1, meaning that when the gap is zero, the promised utility is exactly w. With this
form, the rst-order condition35 with respect to a yields (a) =
f(g)s(w)
 , so the Bellman equation




u1 exp(g) + f(g)( u1 +
1

(logf(g)) + g))   f0(g)`

: (25)
The objective is linear in `, which has unbounded domain. If the contract is not truthful, the agent
therefore wants to lie at an innite rate. To accommodate for this, the agent is now allowed to
report jumps in the cash ows. This expands the reporting domain of the agent.
Let Wt+(L) denote the promised utility of the agent after he reports a jump L in the cash ow
at time t. For contracts with a xed sensitivity parameter, as considered here, a natural closure of
the contract is to stipulate that
Wt+(L) = exp(  sL)Wt: (26)
To see this, notice that if the agent lies at an arbitrarily large rate K between times t and t + ",
his promised utility satises, ignoring second-order eects, the dynamic equation
dWt =  s( Wt)Kdt:
This yields Wt+" = exp( K s")Wt, and results in a gap change Gt+" = Gt + K". Combining the
last two equations yields Wt+" = exp(  s(Gt+"   Gt))Wt, which explains (26).
Report jumps amount to impulse controls on the part of the agent (see for example, ksendal and






u1 exp(g) + f(g)( u1 +  s(` +
1






fexp(  sL)f(g + L)   f(g)g

: (27)
35Note that the objective is strictly concave in a and the domain of a is open, so that the rst-order condition pins
down the unique optimum.
24The function f(g) = exp( sg) solves the equation. Indeed, with that value for f, the second term




u1 exp(g) + exp( sg)






( sg) + g

   sexp( sg)`

 0 (28)
for all g. That term is independent of `, and reduces to
u1 exp(g) + exp( sg)





( sg) + g

Convexity of the exponential implies that, for all g,
exp(g) > exp( sg) + exp( sg)(    s)g:
Since u1 < 0, (28) will be satised if
exp( sg)





( sg) + g

 0:
The second factor is zero, from (18), which concludes the proof.
An optimal control, among many others, associated with the Bellman equation is to set L =  g
if g 6= 0 and L = 0 otherwise, and ` always equal to zero. This means that it is weakly optimal
for the agent to i) always report truthfully if he has been truthful in the past, and ii) immediately
correct any existing gap between real and reported cash ows. It means, in particular, that if the
principal did not know the initial cash ow, the contract is still incentive compatible.
7 Renegotiation and Separating Contracts
Previous sections have focused on separating contracts. It is well-known that, with renegotiation,
the revelation principle need not apply.
To understand the impact of renegotiation on contracting, it is useful to consider the striking,
extreme case where the cost of eort of the agent goes to zero. In that case, Section 5.2 has shown
that the payo of the principal, for any separating contract, becomes arbitrarily negative, provided
that initial promised utility is high enough.
With commitment, the principal could easily avoid this problem. For example, consider a contract
that proposed Ct = Yt + b, for some constant b. Then, the reports of the agent do not aect him:
for any report process, the agent gets a total consumption (Yt + b) + (Xt   Yt) = Xt + b. The cost
25to the principal is simply b=r, which is nite. By choosing b judiciously, the principal can always
achieved any given promised utility to the agent.36
Such contract is not renegotiation-proof. To illustrate, suppose that, after some time, the cash ow
Xt becomes very high and, just for now, that the principal knows it. Then, the principal could
propose the agent a low payment b1 < b in the short term, and a high payment b2 > b in the future.
Owing to mean reversion, the agent expect his cash ow to go down in the future, and given the
concavity of his utility function, may prefer this new contract. The principal can strictly improve
his payo with this contract.
Now suppose that the principal cannot observe the cash ow. He could still propose the above
contract to the agent. If the cash ow is low, the agent will reject this contract, while if the cash-
ow is high, he will accept it. Thus, not only will the contract be renegotiated in some cases, but
the principal will in any case learn more about the agent's type. Because the principal cannot
commit not to renegotiate, he cannot commit not to learn more about the agent's type through
such renegotiation proposal.
One might think that the previous argument is limited in scope, i.e., that the principal may learn
something about the agent, but not the precise cash ow. Indeed, this limitation arises in the two-
period model of Laont and Tirole (1988), where the principal does not get the chance to propose
yet another contract after partially learning the type of the agent. However, the structure of the
present model suggests otherwise. With continuous time, the principal can propose arbitrarily
many contracts in any small time interval, which potentially allows him arbitrarily precisely the
cash ow.37 Moreover, the argument made above is \self similar" in the sense that no matter how
small the uncertainty is about the current cash ow, the principal could always propose a contract
of the form above but more precisely targeted to exploit a small dierent in cash ow levels, that
tells him a bit more about the cash ow.
Short of a rigorous argument, the previous discussion hints at the possibility that the principal
cannot avoid learning about the agent's type.
36Even with a very low cost, the payo of the agent is always bounded, because of mean reversion: the higher the
cash ow, and the more negative the cash-ow drift, for given eort. Therefore, the cash-ows cannot grow arbitrarily
large.
37That feature would also partially arise in a model of \dialogue," with multiple rounds, where the principal and
the agent alternate new contract oers and acceptance/rejection decisions. Such protocol need not need lead to full
type revelation, but should result in more revelation than in a two-period model, where the principal can make only
two contract proposals, in eect committing not to react to the last piece of information he gets from the agent.
268 Permanent Outside Option
Suppose that the agent is allowed to leave the contract at any time and get a continuation utility
w

< 0. This imposes the individual-rationality constraint Wt  w

at all times. How does this
new constraint aect renegotiation? The gist of the previous analysis is unchanged. First, any
internally-consistent contract has continuation payos that only depend on the current state (w;y).
Second, comparing across cash-ow levels, the argument of Section 4.3.1 goes through, so that
contractual variables should depend only on promised utility, not on the cash-ow level. Moreover,
the principal's payo function should vary across cash-ow levels according to Equation (13).
However, the constraint raises a diculty for comparing contracts across initial promised utility.
Indeed, starting for some contract C that is individually rational and incentive compatible given
(w1;y) for w1 > w

, there is no guarantee that, for w2 2 (w

;w1), the (w2;y)-version of C will
also be individually rational. Indeed, that version scales the continuation utility process Wt of
the agent by a factor w2=w1, compared to contract C, and may violate the individual rationality
constraint. Therefore, the individual rationality constraint reduces the set of challengers to any
given continuation contract, and which prevents the comparisons yielding the closed-form formulas
derived in Section 4.3.2.
Conceptually however, the problem is very similar to the unconstrained case. At one extreme, for
w far above w

, the optimal state-consistent contract should be very similar to optimal contract of
the unconstrained case, and the payo and contractual functions should be well approximated by
the closed-form functions derived for that case. At the other extreme, if w = w

, the principal has
very few options to keep the agent in the relationship. Indeed, the only contracts that guarantee
that the constraint is not violated are those for which i) the sensitivity parameter of the promised
utility is exactly zero (for otherwise the promised utility of the agent might drop below w

), and
ii) the drift is positive (to push Wt higher away from w

), for example by providing a low utility
ow. Such extreme contractual characteristics are clearly not required for w high above w

.
The cross-state comparison provides, even in the constrained case, valuable information about the
principal's continuation payo. Precisely, one direction of the unconstrained analysis carries over to
the constrained case, providing a whole family of inequalities comparison for the principal payos.
Suppose that w2 is higher than w1. In that case, the (w2;y)-version of C does satisfy individual
rationality if C did. This observation implies the following: for any individually-rational and state-
consistent contract C, let (w;y) denote the principal's payo under any continuation contract of
C following a history ending up with state (w;y).38
38By internal consistency, the principal's payo depends only on (w;y).















This is intuitive: the farther away one gets from the constraint w

, and the more exibility one
has to choose consumption/eort processes achieving the given promised utility and, therefore, the
higher the payo of the principal can get relative to versions of more constrained contracts starting
with lower promised utility.
In line with the previous argument, one may further conjecture that, for the optimal individually-
rational renegotiation-proof contracts, the sensitivity factor is increasing in w (rather than constant
for the unconstrained case), going from 0 for w = w

to the unconstrained optimum  s (i.e., the
maximizer of (19)), as w gets arbitrary large.
9 Discussion
State Consistency and Stochastic Games The concept of state consistency should be seen as a
generalization of internal consistency to stochastic games. With stochastic games, some underlying
state aects the physical environment of the players. However, players may be able to recognize
that there are clear relations between the sets of feasible continuation games across dierent states,
in the same way that they recognize, in a repeated-game setting, the relation between continuation
payos across dierent histories. Here, state consistency was applied to the particular setting of
a principal-agent relationship where the principal can make arbitrary transfer to the agents and
has alone the initiative to propose a new contract and where the agent has specic utility and cost
functions. The concept is portable, and can clearly be applied to other environments.39
Strong Renegotiation-Proofness and State Consistency State consistency is a weak concept
of renegotiation-proofness.40 There are dierent ways to strengthen the notion. For example, in
the context of repeated games, a contract is said to be strongly renegotiation proof if it is weakly
renegotiation-proof, and there is no weakly renegotiation-proof contract that Pareto dominates it
after any history. The notion is easily extended to stochastic games, requiring that for no value
of the underlying state the continuation payos of the contract are Pareto dominated by those of
a weakly renegotiation proof contract. Of course, there need not in general exist such contract.
39For example, Gromb (1994) considers renegotiation of debt contracts with a binary state (whether investment
occurred in the last period), and compares continuation contracts across these two states.
40Indeed, for the case of repeated games, the concept boils down to internal consistency, or weak renegotiation-
proofness.
28In the present setting, one may show that if a strongly renegotiation proof contract exists, then it
has to be state consistent.41 This result shows how continuation payos vary with the underlying
state, as in Section 4.
Choice of a Production Technology One consequence of Section 5.2 is that, should the principal
choose the production technology as captured by the eort cost function (), he may choose a
technology with lower productivity, even if a high-productivity technology has a comparable or
even lower cost. In contrast, Proposition 11 and Equation (19) imply that the principal's payo
is decreasing with the noise in the production technology, and that increased noise reduces the
principal's ability to reward the agent's eort.
Reporting Constraints and Private Savings The contracts constructed in this paper continue
to be incentive compatible if the agent has constraints on cash-ow reports and transfers (for
example, the agent could be unable to over-report cash ows). Indeed, such constraints only
restrict the agent's strategy space and, hence, the set of possible deviation. For example, private
savings do not oer the agent an enlarged reporting space, since he is already able to make arbitrary
reports.42 The agent could
Additional Signal A natural extension would allow the principal to receive a secondary signal
about the agent's action. The promised utility would then depend on both the agent's report and
on that signal, allowing another the principal to use an additional instrument, the sensitivity to
that other signal. This would enlarge the set of incentive compatible contracts to a two-dimensional
set and mitigate the impact of a atter cost function of the agent on the principal's payo.
41The argument can be sketched easily: for any two states, say (w;x) and ( ~ w; ~ x), a strongly renegotiation proof
contract C must not result in a lower payo, at state ( ~ w; ~ x), than its transformation G(w;x);( ~ w;~ x)(C), which is weakly
renegotiation proof if C is.
42Thus, for example, the strategy of underreporting and saving cash ows today to overreport them in the future
has no value: the agent can already make arbitrary reports.
2910 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 State consistency already implies that after any history leading up to any
state ( ~ w; ~ y) and continuation contract ~ C, ( ~ C)  (G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C)), for otherwise, the principal
could use the transformation G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C) instead of ~ C. Now suppose that the inequality is strict.
Monotonicity of G( ~ w;~ y);(w;y) implies that (G( ~ w;~ y);(w;y)( ~ C)) > (G( ~ w;~ y);(w;y)  G(w;y);( ~ w;~ y)(C)) =
(C), which contradicts state consistency of C: the principal would do better by starting from
G( ~ w;~ y);(w;y)( ~ C) than starting from C, given (w;y). 
Proof of Proposition 3


































































and the initial conditions Y0 = Y 0
0 = y.
































and subject to the initial condition ^ Y0 = ^ Y 0
0 = ^ y.
The reconstructed processes are, by denition, such that
d~ Yt = d^ Yt   (   ^ Yt)dt + (   ~ Yt)dt
and
d~ Y 0
t = d^ Y 0
t   (   ^ Y 0
t)dt + (   ~ Y 0
t)dt
subject to ~ Y0 = ~ Y 0
0 = y. Combining the previous equations yields
d~ Yt =




























subject to the conditions ~ Y0 = ~ Y 0
0 = y. The comparison between objective functions is identical
to (30), and subject to the same dynamic equations and constraints, which establishes optimality
of strategy (L;A). 
Proof of Proposition 9
Let x = 1   u1. It suces to show that, for  s maximizing (19), x < r. From the expressions of
1( s) and u1( s),
(x) =
 x
  +  + x
where   = =, and
u(x) =  
x( + x)
  +  + x




  ( + 1)
1











Suppose that x  r. Then, using that  =  =(r + ) it is easy to show that
 ( + 1)
1





Since also 0(x) > 0, the derivative is negative for x  r, showing that the optimum is achieved for
x < r. 
Proof of Proposition 10
Recall from Proposition 8 that











where 1( s) =  s=, () = 
(r+), u1( s) =   s( +  s)=((    s)), and  s() 2 [0;].
As  goes to zero,  is of order 1= and, after neglecting second-order terms and terms independent
from  s, the objective equals












The maximum can only be attained for  s arbitrarily small, otherwise the second term would be
of order (1=2) (taking into account the factor ), arbitrarily negative, and dominate all other
terms. Precisely,  s must be at most of order . Let  s =  + o(), for some   0 to chosen by






31Therefore, the optimum sensitivity is equal to  s = r + o(). This implies that 1()  r and







This shows that () diverges to +1 if w <  1=r and to  1 if w >  1=r.43




r + u1()   1() = 0:
This shows that immiserization gets arbitrarily muted as  goes to zero. 
43That behavior is easily checked numerically. For instance, if r =  = 5%,  = 1,  = 0:2 and  = 0:01, then
  686 for w =  40, while    2310 for w =  2. For these values of w, the payos respectively get arbitrarily
positive and arbitrarily negative as  gets closer to zero.
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